Apr 30, 2023
Taiwan’s status in the world has never been clear and neitherhas the United States’ position on the issue. In this CongressionalDish, via footage from the C-SPAN archive dating back into the1960s, we examine the history of Taiwan since World War II in orderto see the dramatic shift in Taiwan policy that is happening inCongress - and in law - right now.
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Taiwan History and Background
“In Focus:Taiwan: Political and Security Issues” [IF10275]. Susan V.Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell. Updated Mar 31, 2023.Congressional Research Service.
“Taiwan taps on United Nations’ door, 50 years afterdeparture.” Erin Hale. Oct 25, 2021. Aljazeera.
“China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence: TaiwanesePresident Tsai Ing-wen.” Stacy Chen. Jan 16, 2020. ABCNews.
“Taiwan weighs options after diplomatic allies switchallegiance.” Randy Mulyanto. Sep 26, 2019.Aljazeera.
U.S.-Taiwan Relationship
Past
“The Taiwan Relations Act” [Pub. L. 96–8, § 2, Apr. 10, 1979, 93Stat. 14.]
“22U.S. Code § 3301 - Congressional findings and declaration ofpolicy.” Cornell Law School Legal InformationInstitute.
Current
“Chinamoves warships after US hosts Taiwan's Tsai.” RupertWingfield-Hayes. Apr 6, 2023. BBC News.
“Speaker Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit: Implications for theIndo-Pacific.” Jude Blanchette et al. Aug 15, 2022. Centerfor Strategic and International Studies.
"Pelosi in Taiwan: Signal or historic mistake?” Aug 4, 2022.DW News.
“China threatens 'targeted military operations' as Pelosi arrivesin Taiwan.” News Wires. Feb 8, 2022. France 24.
“Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would be 'ill-conceived' and'reckless.'” Dheepthika Laurent. Feb 8, 2022. France24.
Presidential Drawdown Authority
“Use of Presidential Drawdown Authority for Military Assistance forUkraine.” Apr 19, 2023. U.S. Department of State Bureau ofPolitical-Military Affairs.
U.S. China Relationship
“America, China and a Crisis of Trust.” Thomas L. Friedman. Apr14, 2023. The New York Times.
H.R.7776:James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2023
Outline of Taiwan Provisions
Subtitle G - Other Matters
Sec. 1088: National Tabletop Exercise
- By the end of 2023, the Secretary of Defense is to assess theviability of our domestic critical infrastructure to identifychokepoints and the ability of our armed forces to respond to acontingency involving Taiwan, including our armed forces’ abilityto respond to attacks on our infrastructure.
Subtitle E - Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region
Sec. 1263: Statement of Policy on Taiwan
- “It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain thecapacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that wouldjeopardize the security of thepeople of Taiwan.” Fait accompli isdefined as, “the resort to force by the People’s Republic of Chinato invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States canrespond effectively.”
Sec. 1264: Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises withTaiwan
- Congress wants the Commander of the United States Indo-PacificCommand to carry out joint military exercises with Taiwan in“multiple warfare domains” and practice using “securecommunications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, andother foreign partners”
- Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of thePacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2024. RIMPAC is a multinationalmaritime exercise, now the world’s largest, that has happened 28times since 1971. The last one took place in and around Hawaii andSouthern California in the summer of 2022. 26 countries, includingthe US, participated.
Subtitle A - Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act
PART 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIPBETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
Sec. 5502: Modernizing Taiwan’s Security Capabilities to Deter and,if necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People’s Republic ofChina
Grants:
- Expands the purpose of the State Department’s Foreign MilitaryFinancing Program to “provide assistance including equipment,training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensivemilitary capabilities of Taiwan”
- Authorizes the State Department to spend up to $100 million peryear for 10 years to maintain a stockpile of munitions and otherweapons (authorized by Sec. 5503). Any amounts that are not obligated and used in oneyear can be carried over into the next year (which essentiallymakes this a $1 billion authorization that expires in 2032). Thestockpile money is only authorized if the State Departmentcertifies every year that Taiwan has increased its defense spending(requirement is easily waived by the Secretary of State).
- Authorizes $2 billion per year for the Foreign MilitaryFinancing grants each year for the next 5 years (total $10 billionin grants). The money is expressly allowed to be used to purchaseweapons and “defense services” that are “not sold by the UnitedStates Government” (= sold by the private sector).
- No more than 15% of the weapons for Taiwan purchased via theForeign Military Financing Program can be purchased from withinTaiwan
Loans:
- Also authorizes the Secretary of State to directly loan Taiwanup to $2 billion. The loans must be paid back within 12 years andmust include interest.
- The Secretary of State is also authorized to guaranteecommercial loans up to$2 billion each (which can not be used to payoff other debts). Loans guaranteed by the US must be paid back in12 years.
Sec. 5504: International Military Education and TrainingCooperation with Taiwan
- Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense tocreate a military training program with Taiwan by authorizing theSecretary of State to train Taiwan through the InternationalMilitary Education and Training Program. The purposes of thetraining include enhancements of interoperability between the USand Taiwan and the training of “future leaders of Taiwan”. Thetraining itself can include “full scale military exercises” and “anenduring rotational United States military presence”
Sec. 5505: Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan
- Authorizes the President to drawdown weapons from the stocks ofthe Defense Department, use Defense Department services, andprovide military education and training to Taiwan, the value ofwhich will be capped at $1 billion per year
- The President is also given the “emergency authority” totransfer weapons and services in “immediate assistance” to Taiwanspecifically valued at up to $25 million per fiscal year.
Sec. 5512: Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations
- “The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances provided bythe United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation forUnited States-Taiwan relations.”
- “The increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of thePeople’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to theexpectation of the peaceful resolution of the future ofTaiwan”
- “As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity toresist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that wouldjeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of thepeople on Taiwan should be maintained.”
- The US should continue to support Taiwanese defense forces by“supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and servicesthrough foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, andindustrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities thatsupport an asymmetric strategy.”
- Support should also include “Exchanges between defenseofficials and officers of the US and Taiwan at the strategic,policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan TravelAct.”
PART 3 - INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 5516: Findings
- “Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, theDominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands,and Kiribati, have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan infavor of diplomatic relations with China”
- “Taiwan was invited to participate in the World HealthAssembly, the decision making body of the World HealthOrganization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Sincethe 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasinglyresisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invitedto attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.”
- “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 does notaddress the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at theUnited Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent thepeople of Taiwan.”
Sec. 5518: Strategy to Support Taiwan’s Meaningful Participation inInternational Organizations
- By the end of Summer 2023, the Secretary of State must create aclassified strategy for getting Taiwan included in 20 internationalorganizations. The strategy will be a response to “growing pressurefrom the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations,commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply withits ‘One-China Principle’ with respect to Taiwan.”
PART 4 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 5525: Sense of Congress on Expanding United States EconomicRelations with Taiwan
- “Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods tradingpartner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source ofimports, and a key destination for United States agriculturalexports.”
Evaluating U.S.-China Policy in the Era of StrategicCompetition
February 9, 2023
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Witnesses:
Wendy Sherman, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.Department of State
Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense forIndo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense
Clips
17:40 Wendy Sherman: We remaincommitted to our long standing One China Policy and oppose anyunilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo. Our policy hasnot changed. What has changed is Beijing's growing coercion. So wewill keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defensecapability.
41:30 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): I wantto get a little broader because I think it's important tounderstand sort of the strategic vision behind our tactics oneverything that we do. So if we go back to the late 80s, early 90s,end of the Cold War, and the gamble at the time was, if we createdthis international economic order, led by the US and the West,built on this global commitment to free trade, that this notion ofthat this trade and commerce would bind nations together via trade,via commerce and international interest and economic interest, thatit would lead to more wealth and prosperity, that it would lead todemocracy and freedom, basically domestic changes in manycountries, and that it would ultimately ensure peace. The famoussaying now seems silly, that no two countries with McDonald's haveever gone to war. That's obviously no longer the case. But thepoint being is that was the notion behind it. It was what the thenDirector General of the WTO called a "world without walls,"rules-based international order. Others call it globalization. Andbasically, our foreign policy has been built around that, eventhough it's an economic theory it basically, is what we have builtour foreign policy on. I think it's now fair to say that weadmitted China to the World Trade Organization, Russia as well, Ithink it's now fair to say that while wealth certainly increased,particularly in China through its export driven economy, massive,historic, unprecedented amount of economic growth in that regard, Idon't think we can say either China or Russia are more democratic.In fact, they're more autocratic. I don't think we can say thatthey're more peaceful. Russia has invaded Ukraine now twice, andthe Chinese are conducting live fire drills off the coast ofTaiwan. So I think it's fair to say that gamble failed. And we havenow to enter -- and I think the President actually hinted at someof that in his speech the other night -- we're now entering a newera. What is that new era? What is our vision now for that world,in which not just the global international order and World WithoutWalls did not pacify or buy nations, but in fact, have now placedus into situations where autocracies, through a joint communique,are openly signaling that we need to reject Western visions ofdemocracy and the like. So, before we can talk about what we'regoing to do, we have to understand what our strategic vision is.What is the strategic vision of this administration on what the neworder of the world is?
The Future of War: Is the Pentagon Prepared to Deter and DefeatAmerica’s Adversaries?
February 7, 2023
House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cyber, InformationTechnologies, and Innovation
Witnesses:
Chris Brose, Author
RearAdmiral Upper Half Mark Montgomery (Ret.), SeniorDirector, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation forDefense of Democracies
Peter Singer, Strategist at New America andManaging Partner of Useful Fiction LLC
Clips
1:16:30 Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery: Wedon't have weapons stowed in Taiwan. In the last National DefenseAuthorization Act you authorized up to $300 million a year to beappropriated for Taiwan-specific munitions. The appropriators,which happened about seven days later, appropriated $0. In fact,almost all of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which you allpushed through the NDAA, ended up not being appropriated in theConsolidated Appropriations Act that passed eight days later.
30:10 Chris Brose: Nothing you do inthis Congress will make larger numbers of traditional ships,aircraft and other platforms materialized over the next severalyears. It is possible, however, to generate an arsenal ofalternative military capabilities that could be delivered to U.S.forces in large enough quantities within the next few years to makea decisive difference. Those decisions could all be taken by thisCongress. The goal would be to rapidly field what I have referredto as a "moneyball military," one that is achievable, affordableand capable of winning. Such a military would be composed not ofsmall quantities of large, exquisite, expensive things, but ratherby large quantities of smaller, lower cost, more autonomousconsumable things, and most importantly, the digital means ofintegrating them. These kinds of alternative capabilities existnow, or could be rapidly matured and fielded in massive quantitieswithin the window of maximum danger. You could set this in motionin the next two years. The goal would be more about defense thanoffense, more about countering power projection than projectingpower ourselves. It would be to demonstrate that the United States,together with our allies and partners, could do to a Chineseinvasion or a Chinese offensive what the Ukrainians, with oursupport, have thus far been able to do to their Russian invaders:degrade and deny the ability of a great power to accomplish itsobjectives through violence, and in so doing to prevent that futurewar from ever happening. After all, this is all about deterrence.All of this is possible. We have sufficient money, technology,authorities, and we still have enough time. If we are serious, ifwe make better decisions now, we can push this looming period ofvulnerability further into the future.
The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. NationalDefense
February 7, 2023
House Armed Services Committee
Witnesses:
Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., USN (Ret.), FormerCommander, U.S. Pacific Command
Dr. Melanie W. Sisson, Foreign Policy Fellow,Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Clips
28:15 Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL): Chinais the most challenging national security threat America has facedin 30 years. If we fail to acknowledge that and take immediateaction to deter it, the next 30 years could be devastating for ournation. Under President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has nearlytripled its defense spending in the last decade alone. The PLA hasgone from an obsolete force barely capable of defending its bordersto a modern fighting force capable of winning regional conflicts.The CCP now controls the largest army and navy in the world, with agoal of having them fully integrated and modernized by 2027. TheCCP is rapidly expanding its nuclear capability; they have doubledtheir number of warheads in two years. We estimated it would takethem a decade to do that. We also were just informed by the DOD[that] the CCP now has more ICBM launchers than the United States.The CCP is starting to outpace us on new battlefields as well. Theyhave leapfrogged us on hypersonic technology, they are fieldingwhat we are still developing. They are making advances in AI andquantum computing that we struggle to keep pace with. Finally,their rapid advances in space were one of the primary motivationsfor us establishing a Space Force. The CCP is not building thesenew and advanced military capabilities for self defense. In recentyears, the CCP has used its military to push out its borders, tothreaten our allies in the region, and to gain footholds on newcontinents. In violation of international law, the CCP has builtnew and commandeered existing islands in the South China Sea, whereit has deployed stealth fighters, bombers and missiles. Itcontinues to intimidate and coerce Taiwan, most recently bysurrounding the island with naval forces and launching endlessfighter sorties across its centerline. In recent years, the CCP hasalso established a space tracking facility in South America tomonitor U.S, satellites, as well as an overseas naval base milesfrom our own on the strategically vital Horn of Africa. These arejust a few destabilizing actions taken by the CCP. They speaknothing of the CCPs Belt and Road debt trap diplomacy, it's illegalharvesting of personal data and intellectual property, it's ongoinghuman rights abuses, and its advanced espionage efforts, the latterof which came into full focus for all Americans last week when theBiden administration allowed a CCP spy balloon to traverse some ofour nation's most sensitive military sites. Make no mistake, thatballoon was intentionally lost as a calculated show of force.
44:15 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: Since1979, the United States has adopted a constellation of officialpositions, together known as the One China policy, that allow us toacknowledge but not to accept China's perspective that there is oneChina and that Taiwan is part of China. Under the One China policy,the United States has developed robust unofficial relations withthe government and people of Taiwan consistent with our interest inpreserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. US policy isguided by an interest in ensuring cross-strait disputes areresolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will ofTaiwan's people. This has required the United States to deterTaiwan from declaring independence, and also to deter the CCP fromattempting unification by force. The 40 year success of thestrategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of theUnited States to provide either an unconditional commitment toTaipei that it will come to its defense militarily, or anunconditional commitment to Beijing that we will not. The U.S.national security interest in the status of Taiwan remains that theCCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island's political statuspeacefully. Dual deterrence therefore remains U.S. strategy,reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy which is to oppose unilateralchanges to the status quo by either side.
45:28 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: Themodernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balanceand significantly enough that the United States no longer can beconfident that we would decisively defeat every type of PLA use offorce in the Taiwan Strait. This fact, however, does notnecessitate that the US abandon the strategy of dual deterrence andit doesn't mean that the United States should seek to reconstituteits prior degree of dominance. Posturing the U.S. military toconvince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and everycontingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term and likelybeyond. The PLA is advances are considerable and ongoing, geographyworks in its favor, and history demonstrates that it's far easierto arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capabilitythan it is to arrive at an accurate one. Attempting to demonstratesuperiority for all contingencies would require a commitment offorces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like theglobal power that it is with global interests to which its militarymust also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dualdeterrence to extend its 40 year record of success. We can insteadencourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept thatforces the PLA into sub-optimal strategies and increases the battledamage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept.
46:45 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: U.S.military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows usto threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends foraccess to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitabledamage a use of force would cause to the global economy and theimposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputsneeded to sustain China's economic development and the quality oflife of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China'slosses.
1:04:50 Adm. Harry B. Harris: We'regoing to share the crown jewel of America's military technology,the nuclear submarine and the nuclear reactors, with anothercountry and that's Australia. We have not done that with any othercountry, except for the UK, back in the late 50s, and into the 60s.So here we have the two countries with with that capability, theUnited States and the UK, and we're going to share that withAustralia. It's significant. But it's only going to going to besignificant over the long term if we follow through. So it's adecade long process. You know, some people the CNO, Chief of NavalOperations, has said it could be 30 years before we see anAustralian nuclear submarine underway in the Indian Ocean. I saidthat if we put our hearts and minds to it, and our resources to it,and by ours, I mean the United States', the UK's and Australia's,we can do this faster than that. I mean we put a man on the moonand eight years, and we developed a COVID vaccine in one year. Wecan do this, but we're going to have to put our shoulders to thetask for Australia, which has a tremendous military. For them tohave the long reach of a nuclear submarine force would be dramatic.It would help us dramatically. It would change the balance of powerin the Indian Ocean, and it will make Australia a Bluewater navy.They are our key ally in that part of the world and I'm all forit.
1:32:05 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I thinkthis issue of strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity iscritical, and we have been well served, I'll be the first to saythat, by the policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan over thepast 44 years, but I think the time for ambiguity is over. I thinkwe have to be as clear about our intent with regard to what wouldhappen if the PRC invades Taiwan as the PRC is clear in its intentthat it's ultimately going to seize Taiwan if need.
1:41:25 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I usedto talk about during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, almostevery branch of the U.S. government understood that the SovietUnion was the threat. You know, I used to joke even a park ranger,Smokey Bear, would tell you that the Soviets were the bad guys. Wedidn't have that comprehensive unified view of the PRC. You know,State Department looked at as in negotiation, DOD look at it as amilitary operation, Commerce looked at it as a trading partner, andTreasury looked at it as a lender. So we didn't have this unifiedview across the government. But I think now we are getting to thatunified view and I think the Congress has done a lot to get us inthat position.
1:49:45 Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Wehave the capability to block the transmission of information fromthe balloon back to China, don't we? Adm. Harry B. HarrisJr.: We do. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Andin this type of an environment do you think it's probably likelythat we did that? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: Iwould only guess, but I think General van Herk said that --Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Well you can't see anyreason why we wouldn't do that, right?
U.S.-Taiwan Relations
March 14, 2014
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Witnesses:
Kin Moy, [Former] Deputy Assistant Secretaryfor East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Clips
7:20 [Former] Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): Taiwan is aflourishing multiparty democracy of over 20 million people with avibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of theUnited States alongside much bigger countries like Brazil andIndia. Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship hasundergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan's development into a robustand lively democracy underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship weenjoy today.
14:00 Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA): Ithink that it's important that we provide Taiwan the tools todefend itself, but Taiwan needs to act as well. Taiwan spends lessthan $11 billion on its defense, less than 1/5 per capita what wein America do, and God blessed us with the Pacific Ocean separatingus from China. Taiwan has only the Taiwan Strait. On a percentageof GDP basis, Taiwan spends roughly half what we do. So we shouldbe willing to sell them the tools and they should be willing tospend the money to buy those tools.
1:11:50 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Ithink Chris Smith raised the issue of a One China policy. Does itnot bother you that that exists, that there are statements thatpeople have made, high level officials, that said they they agreedon one China policy? Does the administration not view that as aproblem? Kin Moy: Our one China policy is one thathas existed for several decades now. Rep. Randy Weber(R-TX): Okay. Well, I take that as a no, but let me followup with what Jerry Connolly said. So you haven't sold submarinesyet, you don't take Beijing into account. People around the worldwatch us. Words and actions have consequences. Would you agree thaty'all would be okay with a one Russia policy when it comes toCrimea and the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of ideology?Kin Moy: Well, I can't speak to those issues. Butagain, we are obligated to provide those defense materials andservices to Taiwan and we have been through severaladministrations, I think very vigilant in terms of providingthat.
U.S.-ChinaRelations
May 15, 2008
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Witnesses:
Richard N. Haass, President, Council on ForeignRelations
Harry Harding, Professor of InternationalAffairs, George Washington University, 1995-2009
Clips
1:46:42 Richard N. Haass: The bottomline is China is not yet a military competitor, much less amilitary peer. Interestingly, I think Chinese leaders understandthis. And they understand just how much their country requiresdecades of external stability so that they can continue to focustheir energies and their attention on economic growth and politicalevolution. China is an emerging country, but in no way is it arevolutionary threat to world order as we know it.
1:47:20 Richard N. Haass: We alonecannot bring about a successful us Chinese relationship. What theChinese do and say will count just as much. They will need to beginto exercise restraint and patience on Taiwan. There can be noshortcuts, no use of force. We, at the same time, must meet ourobligations to assist Taiwan with its defense. We can also help bydiscouraging statements and actions by Taiwan's leaders that wouldbe viewed as provocative or worse.
2:03:47 Harry Harding: Now with thesupport and encouragement of the United States, China has nowbecome a member of virtually all the international regimes forwhich it is qualified. And therefore the process of integration isbasically over, not entirely, but it's largely completed. And sothe issue, as Bob Zoellick rightly suggested, is no longer securingChina's membership, but encouraging it to be something more, whathe called a "responsible stakeholder." So this means not onlyhonoring the rules and norms of the system, but also enforcing themwhen others violate them, and assisting those who wish to join thesystem but who lack the capacity to do so. It means, in otherwords, not simply passive membership, but active participation. Itmeans accepting the burdens and responsibilities of being a majorpower with a stake in international peace and stability, ratherthan simply being a free rider on the efforts of others. Now,China's reacted to the concept of responsible stakeholding withsome ambivalence. On the one hand, it appreciates that the UnitedStates is thereby seeking a positive relationship with China. Itsuggests that we can accept and even welcome the rise of Chinesepower and Beijing's growing role in the world. It certainly is seenby the Chinese as preferable to the Bush administration's earlieridea that China would be a strategic competitor of the UnitedStates, as was expressed during the campaign of 2000 and in theearly months of 2001. However, Beijing also perceives, largelycorrectly, that America's more accommodative posture as expressedin this concept is conditional. China will be expected to honorinternational norms and respect international organizations that itdid not create and it may sometimes question. And even moreworrying from Beijing's perspective is the prospect that it's theUnited States that is reserving the right to be the judge as towhether Chinese behavior on particular issues is sufficientlyresponsible or not.
TaiwaneseSecurity
August 4, 1999
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Witnesses:
David “Mike” M. Lampton, Founding Director,Chinese Studies Program, Nixon Center
Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary, East Asianand Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Secretary,Department of Defense
James Woolsey, Former Director, CIA
Clips
9:00 Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE): Taiwansecurity, in my view, flows from its democratic form ofgovernment's growing economic, cultural and political contacts withthe mainland and, ultimately, the United States' abiding commitmentto a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In my opinion, weshould concentrate on strengthening those areas rather than spendtime pre-authorizing the sales of weapon systems, some of whichdon't even exist yet.
20:10 Stanley Roth: There are threepillars of the [Clinton] administration's policy. First, theadministration's commitment to a One China policy is unchanged.Regardless of the position of the parties, we have not changed ourpolicy. The President has said that both publicly and privately.Second, we believe that the best means to resolve these issues isby direct dialogue between the parties themselves. We have takenevery opportunity, including on my own trip to Beijing last weekwith Ken Lieberthal from the NSC, to urge the PRC to continue thisdialogue. It strikes us that it's precisely when times aredifficult that you need to dialogue, and to cancel it because ofdisagreements would be a mistake. China has not yet indicatedwhether or not these talks will continue in the Fall, as had beenpreviously anticipated, but they put out a lot of hints suggestingthat it wouldn't take place, and we are urging them to continuewith this dialogue. Third point that is integral to our position.We have stressed again, at every opportunity, the importance of apeaceful resolution of this issue and the President has made thatabsolutely clear, as did Secretary Albright in her meeting withChinese Foreign Minister Tong in Singapore last week, as did KenLeiberthal and I in our meetings in Beijing. But China can have nodoubts about what the United States' position is, with respect topeaceful resolution of this issue.
1:29:15 Caspar Weinberger: So I don'tthink that we should be hampered by or felt that we are in any waybound by what is said by the communique, nor should we accept theargument that the communique sets the policy of the UnitedStates.
1:32:50 Caspar Weinberger: There aretwo separate states now, with a state-to-state relationship, andthat the unification which was before emphasized, they repeatedagain in the statement of Mr. Koo, the head of their Trans- StraitNegotiating Committee, that the unification might come when Chinaitself, the mainland, changes, but that that has not been the caseand it is not now the case.
1:41:15 David “Mike” Lampton: Onceboth the mainland and Taiwan are in the WTO, each will haveobligations to conduct its economic relations with the otheraccording to international norms and in more efficient ways thannow possible.
1:45:20 James Woolsey: Thedisestablishment of large, state-owned enterprises in China overthe long run will bring some economic freedoms, I believe, thatwill quite possibly help change China and Chinese society and makeit more conducive over time to political freedoms as well. But inthe short run, the unemployment from the disestablishment of thoseenterprises can lead to substantial instability.
U.S.-TaiwanRelations
February 7, 1996
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian andPacific Affairs
Witness:
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of East Asianand Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Clips
16:45 Winston Lord: The TaiwanRelations Act of 1979 forms the basis of US policy regarding thesecurity of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate defense inTaiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security whiledifferences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. I'm going to quote afew sections here because this is a very important statement of ourpolicy. Section two B states, "It is the policy of the UnitedStates to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan byother than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, athreat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area, andof grave concern to the United States. To provide Taiwan with armsof a defensive character, and to maintain the capacity of theUnited States to resist any resort to force or other forms ofcoercion that would jeopardize the security or the socioeconomicsystem of the people on Taiwan." Section three of the TRA alsoprovides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan suchdefense articles and defense services in such quantity as may benecessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defensecapability."
18:00 Winston Lord: The key elementsof the US policy toward the Taiwan question are expressed in thethree joint communiques with the PRC as follows. The United Statesrecognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal governmentof China. The US acknowledges the Chinese position that there isbut one China and Taiwan as part of China. In 1982, the US assuredthe PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of twoChinas, or one China, one Taiwan. Within this context, the peoplethe US will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficialrelations with the people of Taiwan. The US has consistently heldthat the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be workedout peacefully by the Chinese themselves. A sole and abidingconcern is that any resolution be peaceful.
19:30 Winston Lord: The U.S.government made reciprocal statements concerning our intentionswith respect to arms sales to Taiwan, that we did not intend toincrease the quantity or quality of arms supplied, and in factintended gradually to reduce the sales. At the time the jointcommunique was signed, we made it clear to all parties concernedthat our tensions were premised on the PRC's continued adherence toa policy of striving for peaceful reunification with Taiwan.
21:30 Winston Lord: The basicinventory of equipment which Taiwan has or will have in itspossession will, in our view, be sufficient to deter any majormilitary action against Taiwan. While arms sales policy aims toenhance the self defense capability of Taiwan, it also seeks toreinforce stability in the region. We will not provide Taiwan withcapabilities that might provoke an arms race with the PRC or othercountries in the region.
21:55 Winston Lord: Decisions on therelease of arms made without proper consideration of the long termimpact. both on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and on theregion as a whole, would be dangerous and irresponsible. If armedconflict were actually breakout in the Taiwan Strait, the impact onTaiwan, the PRC, and indeed the region, would be extremely serious.The peaceful, stable environment that has prevailed in the TaiwanStrait since the establishment of our current policy in 1979 haspromoted progress and prosperity on both sides of the TaiwanStrait. The benefits to Taiwan and the PRC have been obvious and Ioutline these in my statement. All of these achievements would beimmediately put at risk in the event of conflict in the Strait.Conflict would also be costly to the United States and to ourfriends and allies in the region. Any confrontation between the PRCand Taiwan, however limited in scale or scope, would destabilizethe military balance in East Asia and constrict the commerce andshipping, which is the economic lifeblood of the region. It wouldforce other countries in the region to reevaluate their own defensepolicies, possibly fueling an arms race with unforeseeableconsequences. It would seriously affect the tens of thousands ofAmericans who live and work in Taiwan and the PRC. Relationsbetween the US and the PRC would suffer damage regardless of thespecific action chosen by the President, in consultation withCongress. For all these reasons, we are firmly determined tomaintain a balanced policy, which is best designed to avoidconflict in the area.
